



# The European electricity market

Alignment of system and market operations

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Strasbourg, 3 October 2017

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**Full integration of national markets**  
(increased volume of cross-border trade)

**Large scale RES integration**  
(high volatility of power flows)

**Fostering generation adequacy**  
(missing money problem)

**Growing penetration of DER**

**Flexibility activation**

**Grid development**

**New roles – active consumers, *prosumers, smart grids ...***

**Increasing digital dimension**

**Incentives for smart grid innovations**

## ■ Expected outcome of market-based electrical system operation

### Open access & Non-discrimination



- Efficient utilization of the existing generation resources and transmission infrastructure for energy delivery (providing good short-run operating incentives)
- Efficient development of generation and transmission infrastructure from viewpoint of long-term consumers requirements (supporting forward markets and long-run investments)

## ■ Key requirements for efficient market/system operation

- **System Security** – ensure secure operation of the power systems by including detailed representation of both transmission and generation unit constraints directly in the market clearing processes (forward, day-head, intra-day and balancing market)
- **Economic Efficiency** – ensure comprehensive maximization of total social welfare by including all energy delivery cost components in the market clearing processes (costs of energy, reserves, congestions and losses)
- **Incentive Compatibility** – ensure coherency between market participants behaviors strategies and secure and costs effective use of the grid by applying correct price signals
- **Transparency** – ensure that market participants get access to the full set of market data, allowing to understand both power system and market outcomes

## ■ Suboptimal market results

- **Disrupted competition** – (i) not all capacity offered to the market; (ii) socializing a significant part of energy delivery cost since system operation costs are not properly reflected in the electricity prices, i.e. reserves, congestions, losses
- **High risk of insecure system operation** – significant TSO measures conducted out of the market in order to make the market outcome technically feasible

## ■ Distortion of price formation

- Wholesale prices in EU countries are determined based on „approximated” cross-zonal capacities (significant share of the cross-border trade is in fact technically not feasible), giving incorrect signals to generation dispatch and mid-to-long-term generation investments
- Generous subsidies for RES exercise downward pressure on wholesale prices


## ■ Energy-only market is insufficient to create incentives for required generation investments

- Scarcity pricing is not implemented
- Support systems for particular technologies (RES) reduce competitive market, creating downward pressure on prices
- Regulatory risk creates unstable conditions to invest in new resources (changes of law, implementation of the European Energy Market)

**Market and System operations are currently disintegrated**



# Example of remedial measures to cope with congestions on DE/PL border (the same day as on the previous slide, remedial action exhausted)



- It is often claimed that development of the transmission and distribution network is an ultimate solution to all problems related to inefficiencies of current electricity market
- However, this message is not correct due to the following reasons
  - Development of the network to the copper plate equivalent is economically unjustified - some congestion is economic
  - Rapid development of distributed generation, usually subsidized RES with variable output, brings uncertainty not only to electricity market but also to power systems operation and development
  - Development and management of elastic demand (DSR) requires appropriate price signals
  - Increase of cross-border trade across EU requires appropriate market mechanisms to ensure adequate level of coordination for long-distance power trades and level playing field for market participants from all countries
- Therefore, **appropriate market design**, including congestion management mechanism, is a **cornerstone** of efficient management and development of a power system, giving **correct incentives** to all system users

**■ Locational price signals shall steer market participants decisions**

- Real-time prices are the main means to coordinate the behavior of market participants, directly affecting both the market efficiency and system security
- Real-time prices are the key driver for pricing in wholesale market segments

**■ Capacity offered to the market shall be maximized and out-of-market redispatching measures shall be minimized**

- Market processes based on detailed network representation (Full Network Model) offer all available capacity (so called „thermal”) to the market
- Full Network Model involvement supports prices discovery reflecting energy delivery conditions in time and location, including scarcity periods

**■ Local responsibility for system security implies that TSOs must be able to select efficient means for fulfilling these tasks**

- Role of Regional Security Coordinators (RSC) is to support TSOs in these tasks, not replace
- National power system specificities require different approach to detailed market design and operational procedures, e.g. reserve and risks sizing

**■ Strong regional cooperation of TSOs shall be supported with strong regional cooperation of Member States and NRAs**

- Important policy issues should be addressed at the Member States level

- **Energy market is multitude of players with often conflicting goals**
  - **Generators:** make revenue from generation, allowing for new investments
  - **Traders:** exploit all arbitrage opportunities by trading different time frames and products
  - **Consumers:** satisfy their energy needs at most economical price and in a reliable way
  - **Suppliers:** sell energy in (long-term) retail contracts, managing the wholesale price risks
- **Prices coordinate the behavior of all these market participants and therefore directly affect both the market efficiency and system security**
  - If prices reflect grid and energy balance conditions, price signals are consistent
  - Behavior in line with system needs is remunerated
  - Behavior against the system needs is discouraged

**Get the prices right, so that they provide correct incentives for all grid users, leading to efficient use of resources (transmission, generation, flexibility) while respecting system security**



Thank you for your attention


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- All energy delivery takes place in the **real-time market**. Market participants will anticipate and make forward decisions based on expectations about real-time prices.
- **Day-Ahead/Intra-Day Prices:** Trade/Commitment decisions made day-ahead/intra-day will be affected by the design of day-ahead pricing rules, but the energy component of day-ahead prices will be dominated by expectations about real-time prices.
- **Forward Prices:** Forward prices will look ahead to the real-time, day-ahead and intra-day markets. Although forward prices are developed in advance, the last prices in real-time will drive the system.


**The last should be first. The most important focus should be on the models for real-time prices.**



# Regional operational planning




Taking place on D-1 around 17h-20h, i.e. after the market clearing, with the aim to correct non-feasible market outcome (if necessary)



- **Utilization of the transmission grid should be cost-effective while meeting all the transmission system constraints:**
  - Thermal limits
  - Voltage limits
  - Stability limits
- **When the transactions that parties wish to schedule would result in the violation of constraints, the system is congested and the TSO must take action to relieve the constraints violations - this is congestion management**
- **The options the TSO has:**
  - Option 1: solve constraints outside the markets and socialize related cost
  - Option 2: solve these scarce resources through market mechanisms

# Option 1: Market/System operation based on two-step approach - Market Clearing & Redispatching




- **Main advantages**

- Easy to understand and analyse
- Simple solution algorithms

- **Main challenges**

- Market processes run in parallel compete for the same resources (valid also for non market based redispatching)
- A large part of the energy delivery cost is socialized (tariff charges)
- Timing conflicts (between trading and redispatching processes)

# Option 2: Market/System operation based on Integrated Process



- **Main advantages**

- Co-optimization of all resources and transmission capacity utilization (e.g. reserves and energy schedules can compete for transmission capacity)
- System security requirements are reflected in energy prices (e.g. scarce resources and services are priced)
- There is no timing conflict

- **Main challenges**

- Full Network Model
- Greater data requirements
- More sophisticated algorithms/less intuitive market outcome


- **Appropriate Biding Zones definition is a cornerstone of efficient Flow-Based capacity allocation**
  - Transactions within bidding zone are not controlled by the FBA mechanism
  - Biding Zones structure shall reflect grid structure, allowing FBA to manage the impact of commercial transitions on power flows in critical network elements
  - Market transactions within Bidding Zones shall not result in significant flows outside this Bidding Zone
- **Delimitation of biding zones vs market liquidity**
  - Liquidity provided by trading hubs: *vide* Nordpool, trading hubs in US nodal markets, etc.
  - Correct definition of Bidding Zones will maximize use of transmission infrastructure, demand inside Bidding Zones could be satisfied from internal resources and via cross-border lines thanks to efficient Market Coupling (*kind of* LMP mechanism)
  - Load pockets will remain an issue, whatever the size of zones

- **Problems with Zonal Markets**

- Intra-zonal congestion must be infrequent, inexpensive and non-predictable, to avoid:
  - Infeasible market schedules
  - Excessive need for real-time dispatch corrections
  - Gaming (i.e. DEC game)
- Zone definition requires studies and constant monitoring
- Challenging in highly meshed grids
- Difficulties with Zonal PTDF calculation
- Inefficient transmission loss allocation (losses are ignored)
- Different treatment of intra-zonal and inter-zonal transactions

- **Market consequences**


- Risk of infeasible schedules
- Market prices not reflecting the real costs of electricity delivery
- Lower social welfare




**Legend:**

- AMF – Available Maximum Flow
- FNM – Full Network Model
- GSK<sub>F</sub> – Generation Shift Key (forecast)
- GSK<sub>R</sub> – Generation Shift Key (in real terms)
- MC – Market Clearing
- OF – Objective Function
- PTDF<sub>n</sub> – Power Transfer Distribution Factor (nodal)
- PTDF<sub>z</sub> – Power Transfer Distribution Factor (zonal)
- ZMC – Zonal Market Clearing
- ZNM – Zonal Network Model

# Key implementation tools - Full Network Model





### Components of LMP:

1. Marginal Cost of Energy
2. Marginal Cost of Congestions
3. Marginal Cost of Transmission Losses